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Abstract
To understand the neural processing that underpins dishonest behavior in an economic
exchange game task, this study employed both functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) and event-related potential (ERP) methodologies to examine the neural conditions of
25 participants while they were making either dishonest or honest choices. It was discov-
ered that dishonest choices, contrary to honest choices, elicited stronger fMRI activations in
bilateral striatum and anterior insula. It also induced fluctuations in ERP amplitudes within
two time windows, which are 270–30 milliseconds before and 110–290 milliseconds after
the response, respectively. Importantly, when making either dishonest or honest choices,
human and computer counterparts were associated with distinct fMRI activations in the left
insula and different ERP amplitudes at medial and right central sites from 80 milliseconds
before to 250 milliseconds after the response. These results support the hypothesis that
there would be distinct neural processing during making dishonest decisions, especially
when the subject considers the interests of the counterpart. Furthermore, the fMRI and ERP
findings, together with ERP source reconstruction, clearly delineate the temporal sequence
of the neural processes of a dishonest decision: the striatum is activated before response,
then the left insula is involved around the time of response, and finally the thalamus is acti-
vated after response.
Introduction
Dishonest behavior is a common social phenomenon in everyday living [1, 2] and as such
there has been an increasing momentum in research on understanding the neural underpin-
nings of dishonest behavior [3–7]. In a socioeconomic situation, dishonest behavior can be pre-
sented as attempts to increase one’s profits at the expense of other people’s well-being through
intentionally utilizing the victims’ ignorance of the truth [8]. Previous studies on social decision
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making, e.g., reciprocity, trust, fairness, have shown that various processes of specific neural
processing are involved when an individual begins to consider the interests of his or her coun-
terparts (for a review, see Rilling and Sanfey [9]). Thus, it is both interesting and important to
understand whether the neural processing involved during the making of dishonest decisions
is different when a decision maker does or does not consider the interests of the counterpart.
This knowledge may enhance our current understanding of the inner neural mechanisms
related to dishonesty in real life. Unfortunately, very few studies looked into that comparison.
In this study, we investigated the neural correlates of dishonest decisions through employing
an economic exchanging game task. This task paradigm was adapted from the classical Trust
Game [10] and is able to imitate dishonest behaviors and the thought processes underpinning
them in real life, such as those of occupying another person’s property, taking advantage of the
victim’s ignorance, and running the risk of being caught and punished for dishonesty. The dis-
honest choices could consist of two processes, including the “participant’s self-serving inten-
tion” (i.e., whether to occupy the counterpart’s benefits) and “the risk of the action itself” (i.e.,
whether the choice will be detected), and we did not aim to differentiate them in this study.
Therefore, a “dishonest choice” denoted a choice with a self-serving intention that was risky
and led to either large reward (i.e., not detected) or no reward (i.e., detected and punished).
In contrast, an “honest choice” meant a choice without a self-serving intention that always
resulted in medium reward. Our previous behavioral studies have shown that this task could
soundly replicate the process of choosing to make dishonest decisions [11]. In the task, the par-
ticipant was asked to interact with his or her human and computer counterparts. Most impor-
tantly, the participant was told that a dishonest choice will lead to the reduction in the income
of the human counterpart. In contrast, dishonest and honest choices would not affect the com-
puter counterpart. Furthermore, participants in our study were not asked to attempt manipu-
lating the truth because we were interested in the neural processing of making a dishonest
decision. Hence, we avoided confusion caused by fabrication of information.
In our task paradigm, as in many social interactions, a dishonest choice is associated with
either larger gains or larger losses compared to the consequences of an honest choice. There-
fore, anticipation of a dishonest (versus honest) choice may elicit either positive or negative
feelings. Previous studies have shown that the insula is activated by either positive or negative
feelings [12]. Furthermore, a decision to commit to dishonest behavior when interacting with
human beings is often associated with reducing others’ profits to increase self-benefits and is
therefore antisocial (helpful dishonesty and white lies are not discussed here [4, 13]). This is
because playing dishonestly against human contradicts mutual cooperation in society [9, 14],
which is crucial for the functioning of the society. Guilt may thus affect the dishonest individ-
ual, which is not ideal [15, 16]. Moreover, humans are, by nature, empathetic with regard to
the experiences of other individuals [17, 18]. Thus, an individual who plays dishonestly against
human may foresee the potential losses suffered by the victim and, hence, suffer from regret
and other negative emotions. Researchers have found that stronger activations in the insula
were triggered by conditions that violate social norms [19–21] (however, see van den Bos et al.
[22]) and by empathizing with others’ pains [23]. Furthermore, previous studies have shown
that increased insula activations often precede safe choices [24] and the rejection of buying
high-priced products [25]. All of these evidences have supported the role of insula in respond-
ing to either positive or negative feelings and in making decisions. We thus hypothesized to
find different insula activations between making dishonest and honest choices, and also
hypothesized that the dishonest- and honest-related insula activations are modulated by the
counterpart type.
Our second aim was to investigate when the neural processing during dishonest decisions
occurs, in addition to where the neural processing occurs. Previous studies on dishonest
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decisions had often employed neuroimaging methodologies such as fMRI (functional magnetic
resonance imaging). Their high spatial resolution has bettered our understanding of the neural
substrates when a dishonest choice is made. On the other hand, their low temporal resolution
(e.g., about 2–3 seconds for fMRI) has prevented us from investigating the dynamic changes of
the neural responses, especially when a dishonest decision is made very quickly [26, 27]. In this
study, all participants were invited to take part in both fMRI and ERP (event-related potential)
recordings (in different sessions). The two methods contributed to the determination of neural
correlates, using both high spatial resolution (a few millimeters, or mm) and high temporal res-
olution (about a millisecond, or ms). In one of our previous studies, the combination of these
two methods successfully delineated a neural model of lying on face familiarity [28].
Neurophysiological study on dishonest decisions has been scarce, and little is known about
the quick neural processing (about hundreds of ms) preceding the making of a dishonest
choice. Previous studies on deception through using memorized words [29], different attitudes
[30] and face familiarity [28] have shown that ERPs within 300 ms before responses were dif-
ferent when deceptive and non-deceptive responses were made. Therefore, we also hypothe-
sized that different ERP amplitudes could be detected before dishonest and honest choices
were made within the interval 300 ms.
Our third aim was to delineate a neural model to describe the dynamic interactions between
temporal and spatial neural processing in the dishonest decisions. The fMRI and ERP data
were acquired via the test conducted on the same group of volunteers employing the same task
paradigms. Thus, the participants might have utilized similar cognitive/affective strategies
across sessions. We hypothesized that, within the before-response intervals determined by ERP
data, the brain regions determined by fMRI data would show different source intensities for
dishonest and honest choices.
Materials and Methods
This research has been approved by The Ethics Committee in the East China Normal Univer-
sity, Shang Hai, China.
Participants
Twenty-six Chinese female university students in the East China Normal University, China,
participated in both fMRI and ERP sessions. Only females were recruited to avoid the potential
gender difference in decision making [11, 31]. All of the participants were right-handed [32]
with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. None of them reported a history of physical, neu-
rological, or mental disorders. All participants gave written informed consent for a protocol
approved by the local ethics committee. One participant was excluded due to technical prob-
lems during ERP data recording. Finally, 25 participants (20~25 years old) were included in
data analyses.
Experimental design
Each participant received instructions before the experiment: “You will play in an online
game as one of the trustees interacting with anonymous investors. Half of the investors will
be human beings and the other half will be computer programs. A photo of either a human
face or a laptop will be presented during each trial to indicate the type of the investor (human
or computer) without other information. You should treat each trial as a single-shot interac-
tion since players won’t recognize each other. In each trial, you will receive monetary invest-
ment from an investor, then repay a proportion of the increased investment and hold the
rest. You will also receive a proposal from the investor on how to divide the reward. You
Neural Correlates of Dishonest Choices
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should choose by yourself to repay as much as (honest choice) or less than (dishonest choice)
the portion proposed. After that, a computer center will decide whether or not with 5:5
chance to show the real information to the investor. You will win nothing in the trial if a dis-
honest choice is caught but will gain your portion in the other conditions. The expected util-
ity (reward × possibility) will be indifferent between a dishonest choice and an honest choice.
As a result, a human investor will obtain less than or equal to the portion that he or she
should get according to the proposal, depending on whether the choice is a dishonest or an
honest one. On the contrary, there will be no actual payment to a computer investor. All
human players finally will receive real monetary bonuses proportional to the amounts earned
during the experimental sessions.” After receiving the abovementioned information, the par-
ticipants did not know that, in fact, they were actually always playing a computer counterpart
and never playing a human counterpart.
In this task, the portions of reward assigned to the counterpart and the participant were
respectively represented by the cyan and purple areas in the vertical stacked bars shown in the
screen. In each trial (for a schemata of the task, see Fig 1), after a fixation presented for 2~6 s,
the amount of the increased investment (i.e., the total amount to be divided) and the proposal
bar were shown on the left-hand side for 4 s (i.e., Decision phase) during which the participant
had to make her choice by choosing (through pressing one of two buttons with the right index
or middle finger) between the two bars in the middle of the screen. One of the two bars was
consistent with the proposal by the counterpart (i.e., honest bar), whereas the other bar (i.e.,
dishonest bar) indicated a plan advantageous to the participant herself. The two bars were
matched in positions by the two response buttons. During the Decision phase, once the
response was made, a black line appeared under the chosen bar. If there was no response, or
should the response exceed the Decision phase, all reward would be sent to the counterpart. In
the following 4 s (i.e., Outcome phase), the participant was informed of whether the real situa-
tion was detected by the counterpart and how much she gained.
During the Outcome phase, a black line appeared above the outcome bar if the real situation
was detected; while no line was shown if the detection did not occur. The probability of detec-
tion was always 50%. When a dishonest choice was detected, the participant gained nothing in
this trial and her area in the outcome bar became black. Under the other conditions, the partic-
ipant kept the portion of herself. The human investors’ faces consisted of 2 males and 2 females
(of frontal view with neutral expression), and were shown randomly. The permutation of the
total amount, i.e., the amount to be divided (80~150), the proposed portion of repayment to
the counterpart (60%, 65%, 70%), and the location (left or right) of the dishonest and honest
bars were randomized within each participant. These values were adapted from those in our
previous study [11] and were clearly justified in the supplementary document: S1 Supporting
Information.
Experimental procedure
Each participant was asked to participate in two sessions (within 2 weeks) in which Blood-oxy-
gen-level dependent (BOLD) signals or scalp electrical signals were collected. The order of the
two sessions was counterbalanced across participants. Each participant practiced 8~15 trials
before the formal experiment to familiarize herself with the task paradigm. Moreover, to reduce
the ERP artifacts caused by eye movement, she was trained to blink only within the inter-trial-
interval. In the formal task, there were 5 runs of 24 trials in the fMRI session and 12 runs of 24
trials in the ERP session. More trials were included in the ERP session to compensate for the
relatively low signal-to-noise ratio in ERP data recording. After completing the two sessions,
each participant was asked to fill in a questionnaire including the question ‘Howmany human
Neural Correlates of Dishonest Choices
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counterparts do you feel that you have played against in this game?’ They were debriefed and
received 250 Chinese yuan (no difference across participants because of the local ethical
requirements) as compensation, including the bonus for the task. She was not allowed to know
the other participants’ income.
Data acquisition
Neuroimaging scans were conducted on a 3-Tesla Siemens Trio MR scanner. Thirty-five axial
slices covering the whole brain were obtained using a T2-weighted echo planar imaging (EPI)
sequence (TR = 2000 ms, TE = 30 ms, flip angle = 90°, matrix = 64×64, Field of View (FOV) =
240×240 mm2, slice thickness = 4 mm without gap) for functional images. The axial slices were
adjusted to be parallel to the AC-PC plane. A high-resolution structural image for each partici-
pant was also acquired using 3DMRI sequences (TR = 1900 ms, TE = 3.43 ms, flip angle = 7°,
matrix = 256×256, FOV = 210×210 mm2, slice thickness = 1 mm). The visual stimuli presenta-
tions and response collections were performed through the integrated functional imaging sys-
tem (IFIS).
Scalp electrical potentials were recorded through an elastic electroencephalogram (EEG)
cap (Brain Products Company, Germany) embedded with 64 tin scalp electrodes according to
the extended international 10–20 system. All channel recordings were referenced to a channel
at the vertex, and all channel impedances were kept below 10 kO. The EEG signals were ampli-
fied using a 0.05–100 Hz band-pass filter and continuously sampled at 500 Hz. Vertical and
horizontal eye movements were recorded by two electrodes at the temporal and lower sides of
Fig 1. Task paradigm and behavioral performances. In each trial, after an inter-trial-interval (2~6 s), a
dishonest or an honest choice was made within the Decision phase and was followed by a feedback in the
Outcome phase. The portions of rewards assigned to the counterpart (investor) and the participant (trustee)
were respectively represented by the cyan and purple areas in the vertical stacked bars. The frequencies of
dishonest choices were shown in the lower left corner. Participants made fewer dishonest choices when
interacting with human than computer investors. Dis = dishonest choice, Hon = honest choice, Hm = human
investor, PC = computer investor, Y = detected, N = not detected. Error bar denotes the standard error of the
mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0153660.g001
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the left eye, respectively. The visual stimuli presentations and response collections were per-
formed through E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.).
Data analysis
Behavioral data. Considering that participants made choices in more than 95% of the tri-
als in both sessions, the trials without responses or response exceeding the Decision phase were
dropped from analyses. The reaction time in both sessions was log-transformed to correct
for its skewed distribution, and was analyzed with a repeated measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) model with three within-subjects factors, i.e., Session (fMRI vs. ERP), Choice (dis-
honest vs. honest) and Investor (human vs. computer). The frequency of dishonest choice (= 1
–frequency of honest choice) in both sessions was entered into a repeated measures ANOVA
model with two within-subjects factors, i.e., Session (fMRI vs. ERP) and Investor (human vs.
computer). Results were considered statistically significant at p< 0.05. Post hoc analysis with
Bonferroni correction was employed for significant interactions. Behavioral data were analyzed
using SPSS version 20.0 software (IBM Corp.).
fMRI data. The SPM8 software (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, UK)
was employed for the preprocessing of both the neuroimaging and neurophysiological data, as
well as for the fMRI, ERP, and source reconstruction analyses. The functional scans of each
participant were spatially realigned to adjust for head movement and corrected for slice-acqui-
sition timing. Anatomical images were then co-registered to the mean functional image and
were segmented into grey/white matter according to an anatomical template of Eastern Asian
brains. After that, the functional images were normalized to the Montreal Neurological Insti-
tute (MNI) brain template and smoothed with an 8-mm full-width half-maximum (FWHM)
Gaussian filter.
In this study, we were only interested in the processing of decision making. The findings
(both fMRI and ERP) during the outcome presentation are reported elsewhere [33]. The gen-
eral line model (GLM) was used to examine the experimental effects across task events. Four
regressors were employed to model the 4s-duration of the Decision phase. They were combina-
tions of Choice (dishonest vs. honest) and Investor (human vs. computer). A regressor model-
ing the onset of button pressing and six extra regressors modeling residual head motions
were also included. These regressors were convolved with the SPM canonical hemodynamic
response function. High-pass temporal filtering with a cut-off of 128 s was recruited to remove
low-frequency drifts. The parameter estimates (βs) for each condition per run were calculated
for all brain voxels. They were then used to form the contrasting images of the four experimen-
tal conditions, which were the combinations of Choice (dishonest vs. honest) and Investor
(human vs. computer).
The contrasting images from all participants were then group-level analyzed through a two-
way ANOVA model with 2 within-subject factors, i.e., Choice and Investor. Results of whole
brain analyses survived peak-level FWE (family wise error) correction (p< 0.05) within the
whole brain. Results of the interaction effect between Choice and Investor was voxel-level
height thresholded at p< 0.001 with cluster size of 20 voxels, and survived cluster-level
FWE correction (p< 0.05) within bilateral insula. The WFU Pickatlas toolbox (http://www.
nitrc.org/projects/wfu_pickatlas/) was used to generate a mask image of bilateral insula. The
xjView toolbox (http://www.alivelearn.net/xjview) was used for the anatomical definition. The
MarsBaR toolbox (http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/) was used to extract the % signal change for
each task condition from each participant, if necessary. The % signal changes were analyzed
using a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) model with two within-subjects fac-
tors, i.e., Choice (dishonest vs. honest) and Investor (human vs. computer).
Neural Correlates of Dishonest Choices
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ERP data. The continuous recordings were filtered (0.1–30 Hz), corrected for eye-move-
ment [34], cut into two types of epochs (-200~300 ms post stimulus onset, and -3800~500
ms post button press), and corrected for baseline signals (-200~0 ms post stimulus onset and
-3800~-3600 ms post response corresponding to the above two types of epochs, respectively).
The two types of epochs were utilized to investigate the neural responses that were time-
locked to either stimulus onset or response. In order to remove the effects of motor response
from the dataset time-locked to stimulus onset, the length of stimulus-locked epochs
(except for its baseline) was shorter than the shortest reaction time across trials and across
participants. Furthermore, to make sure that the baselines of the epochs time-locked to
response were not influenced by the early neural processing during the Decision phase, the
length of the response-locked epoch (except for its baseline) was longer than the longest reac-
tion time across trials and across participants. Epochs containing amplitudes exceeding
±100 μV were removed. Epochs were averaged for each task condition and for each partici-
pant through using the robust averaging method [35]. An additional low-pass filter (< 30
Hz) was employed to remove the high-frequency noises elicited by the robust averaging. The
ERP data were then re-referenced to a computed average of the whole-scalp EEG channels.
After these steps, the ERP datasets were down-sampled to 100 Hz and were converted into
three-dimensional images by linear interpolation. The x, y and z dimensions reflect “left-
right”, “anterior-posterior” and “early-late”, respectively. The images were smoothed by an
FWHM of [9 mm, 9 mm, 20 ms] [28]. The statistical analyses for ERP data were similar to
those for the fMRI data. The results were voxel-level height thresholded at p< 0.01 and
survived cluster-level FWE correction (p< 0.05) within the whole scalp × time space of
interest (0~300 ms for stimulus-locked data, and -300~300 ms for response-locked data,
respectively).
fMRI-informed ERP source reconstruction. The source reconstruction analysis was
recruited to test whether the possible brain sources (revealed by fMRI results) were activated
within the time intervals (defined by ERP results) for the contrasts of interest [28]. It is based
on the group inversion (imaging) method [36]. We first matched an SPM template head
model to standard scalp electrode positions of the extended 10–20 system, given that we did
not record each individual’s EEG channel locations due to machine errors. We then employed
the boundary element model (BEM) for the forward model calculation. Datasets related with
the effects of interest, i.e., (I) conditions (human & honest + human & dishonest) and (com-
puter & honest + computer & dishonest) for the main effect of Investor, (II) conditions
(human & dishonest + computer & dishonest) and (human & honest + computer & honest)
for the main effect of Choice and (III) conditions (human & dishonest + computer & honest)
and (human & honest + computer & dishonest) for the interaction effect between Choice and
Investor, in each participant were investigated by the Multiple Sparse Priors (MSP) approach
[37] within the time windows of interest. The source locations were further restricted within
spheres (radius = 24 mm) in which the center was located at the peak significance detected by
fMRI data [38]. For each participant, the intensity of source activity for each task condition
within the time window of interest was converted into the brightness of a 3D image which
could be superimposed onto a standard MNI brain template. Finally, after spatial smoothing
with a FWHM of 12 mm, images were analyzed with paired t tests. Absolute statistical values
were reported because this source analysis did not reflect the polarity of contrasts. The results
were voxel-level height thresholded at p< 0.05 (uncorrected). This lenient threshold was
recruited because our aim was to test whether there was a difference of source intensities
between conditions for the contrasts of interest around the spatial priors, but not to explore
within the whole brain.
Neural Correlates of Dishonest Choices
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Results
Behavioral findings
The trial number for each task condition in either fMRI or ERP sessions was shown in Table 1.
We found that choices in the ERP session (1166.5±57.3 ms) were made quicker (F(1,24) =
21.460, p< 0.001) than in the fMRI session (1291.7±52.8 ms). This difference might be due to
the training effect caused by more trials in the ERP session than in the fMRI session. Impor-
tantly, no significant interaction effect involving the factor Session was found for the frequency
of dishonest choices or for the reaction time (Fs< 1, ps> 0.5), suggesting that the participants’
choices were consistent between sessions.
No significant main effect of Session (F(1,24) = 0.005, p = 0.946) was found for frequency of
choice. Fewer dishonest choices (F(1,24) = 4.533, p = 0.044) were made for human (44.1±3.4%
averaged across sessions) than computer (49.6±3.0% averaged across sessions) investors (as
shown in Fig 1, lower left corner). Moreover, a significant interaction effect between Choice
and Investor was found for the reaction time (F(1,24) = 4.801, p = 0.038). However, post hoc
analyses did not show significant difference between dishonest and honest choices whatever
the counterpart was a computer (F(1,24) = 0.008, p = 0.929) or a human (F(1,24) = 2.723,
p = 0.112). For the behavioral data collected within the ERP session, the shortest and longest
reaction times across trials and across participants were 334 ms and 3516 ms, respectively.
These values were used to define epochs for ERP data analyses.
Twelve participants reported that they felt that they had played against 1–5 human coun-
terparts during the tasks. Eleven participants reported that the number of human counter-
parts was above five. Two participants reported that they believed that there were several
human counterparts, although they could not feel their counterparts because of the indirect
interaction.
fMRI findings
Results of fMRI analyses were shown in Table 2. Human versus computer investors elicited
stronger BOLD signals in bilateral fusiform gyrus, right medial orbitofrontal cortex, right lin-
gual gyrus, left superior frontal gyrus, and bilateral precuneus (Fig 2A). Dishonest versus hon-
est choices elicited stronger BOLD activations in the left thalamus, bilateral striatum, bilateral
anterior insula, and right supplementary motor area (Fig 3A). No stronger activations were
detected for honest than dishonest choices. No stronger activations were detected for computer
than human investors.
An interaction between Choice and Investor was found in left middle insula (Fig 4A). The
% signal changes extracted from the cluster in the left middle insula showed that there was a
trend that human versus computer counterpart was associated with increased activations when
Table 1. Trial Number for each task condition in either fMRI or ERP sessions.
PC & Hon Hm & Hon PC & Dis Hm & Dis
fMRI session
Mean 29.6 32.4 28.8 25.9
Std 8.2 9.3 9.2 9.1
ERP session
Mean 71.2 80.0 71.7 62.8
Std 29.8 28.8 29.7 30.6
Notes: Dis = dishonest choice; Hon = honest choice; Hm = human investor; PC = computer investor.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0153660.t001
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making honest choices (t(24) = 2.037, p = 0.053), and human versus computer counterpart was
related with decreased activations when playing dishonestly (t(24) = -2.612, p = 0.015). Dis-
honest versus honest choices were associated with stronger activations when playing against
computer counterpart (t(24) = 5.493, p< 0.001), while there was no significant difference
between dishonest and honest choices when interacting with human counterparts (t(24) =
-0.188, p = 0.853).
ERP findings
Results of ERP analyses were shown in Table 3. Human versus computer investor elicited more
positive-going amplitudes in the frontal-central sites (close to FC1) and more negative-going
amplitudes in the right occipito-temporal sites (close to TP10) within 100~190 ms time-locked
to stimulus (Fig 2B). No other effects were found significant for the stimulus-locked data.
Table 2. The fMRI results.
Brain Area Cluster Z x y z
Main effect of Choice
Dis > Hon
L Tha 415 6.166 -3 -13 7
R Str 6.151 12 5 -2
L Str 5.922 -12 8 -3
L Ins (BA13) 23 5.330 -27 29 -2
R Ins (BA13) 70 5.329 42 23 4
R SMA (BA6) 23 5.236 9 8 58
Dis < Hon
NS
Main effect of Investor
Hm > PC
R FFA (BA37) 228 6.290 45 -49 -17
L FFA (BA37) 256 6.022 -42 -64 -17
R mOFC (BA11) 88 5.470 9 44 -14
R Lin (BA18) 21 5.222 6 -88 -5
L SFG (BA9) 37 5.220 -9 50 37
L/R Pre (BA31) 46 5.010 0 -55 31
Hm < PC
NS
Interaction between Choice and Investor
Hm(Dis-Hon) > PC(Dis-Hon)
NS
Hm(Dis-Hon) < PC(Dis-Hon)
L Ins (BA13) 20 3.770 -39 2 -5
Notes: The effects of Choice and Investor survived peak-level FWE correction (p < 0.05) within the whole
brain. Their interaction effect survived cluster-level FWE correction (p < 0.05) in bilateral insula.
Cluster = number of voxels within the cluster; Z = Z value; BA = Brodmann’s area; L = left; R = right;
FFA = fusiform face area; Ins = insula; Lin = lingual gyrus; mOFC = medial orbitofrontal cortex;
Pre = precuneus; SFG = superior frontal gyrus; SMA = supplementary motor area; Tha = thalamus;
Str = striatum; Dis = dishonest choice; Hon = honest choice; Hm = human investor; PC = computer
investor.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0153660.t002
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For the response-locked data, no significant result was found for the effect of Investor. Dis-
honest versus honest choices elicited more negative-going amplitudes in the left frontal-central
sites (close to channel FC5) within the time window -270~-30 ms. Moreover, in a time interval
post response, i.e., 110~290 ms, dishonest versus honest choices elicited more positive-going
amplitudes in the right frontal sites (close to channel F2, see Fig 3B).”
An interaction between Choice and Investor was found in the central sites (close to C1
within -70~250 ms, and close to C6 within -80~100 ms; Fig 4B). The mean amplitudes
extracted from the two channels within the corresponding time windows showed that human
versus computer counterpart was associated with less negative-going amplitudes in channel C1
(t(24) = 2.536, p = 0.018) and less positive-going amplitudes (nonsignificant trend) in channel
C6 (t(24) = -1.937, p = 0.065) when honest choices were made. By contrast, human versus
Fig 2. fMRI and ERP findings for the main effect of Investor.Human (Hm) versus computer (PC) investor
elicited (A) stronger activations in bilateral fusiform face areas (FFA) and right medial orbitofrontal cortex
(mOFC) (p < 0.05 FWE correction, cluster 20 voxels), and (B) more positive-going amplitudes in the frontal-
central sites (close to FC1) and more negative-going amplitudes in the right occipito-temporal sites (close to
TP10) within 100~190 ms time-locked to stimulus. The SPM Tmap (for fMRI data) and the scalp topography
(for ERP data) represented the contrast of (Hm-PC). The waveforms in the representative channel are shown
for the ERP findings. The horizontal black bars represent the time windows detecting statistical significance.
Here, 0 ms indicates the time point of stimulus onset. L = left.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0153660.g002
Fig 3. fMRI and ERP findings for the main effect of Choice.Dishonest (Dis) versus honest (Hon) choices
elicited (A) stronger activations in bilateral striatum (Str) and anterior insula (aIns) (p < 0.05 FWE correction,
cluster 20 voxels), and (B) more negative-going amplitudes within -270~-30 ms in the left frontal-central
sites (close to FC5), and more positive-going amplitudes within 110~290 ms in the right frontal sites (close to
F2). The SPM Tmap (for fMRI data) and the scalp topography (for ERP data) represented the contrast of
(Dis-Hon). The waveforms in the representative channel are shown for the ERP findings. The horizontal black
bars represent the time windows detecting statistical significance. Here, 0 ms indicates the time point of
response. L = left.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0153660.g003
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computer counterpart was associated with more negative-going amplitudes in channel C1
(t(24) = -2.254, p = 0.034) and more positive-going amplitudes in channel C6 (t(24) = 2.099,
p = 0.047) when dishonest choices were made.
Source analyses findings
The source analyses results were shown in Fig 5 and Table 4. Human and computer investors
elicited different source intensities in brain regions close to medial orbitofrontal cortex and
bilateral fusiform face areas within 100~190 ms post stimulus onset. Honest and dishonest
choices elicited different source intensities in brain regions close to striatum within -270~-30
ms and in areas close to thalamus within 110~290 ms post response. The interaction between
Choice and Investor was found in brain regions close to left insula within -80~250 ms post
response.
Discussion
Our study is the first on the neurological implications of dishonest decisions that employs both
neuroimaging and neurophysiological methodologies on the same experimental task. It is also
the first study to investigate the neural correlates in relation to dishonest decisions when the
Fig 4. fMRI and ERP findings for interaction between Choice and Investor. (A) In left middle insula, there
was a trend that human versus computer counterpart was associated with increased activations when
making honest choices, and human versus computer counterpart was related with decreased activations
when playing dishonestly. (B) Within the time window of -80~250ms time-locked to response, human versus
computer counterpart was associated with less negative-going amplitudes in channel C1 and less positive-
going amplitudes (nonsignificant trend) in channel C6 when honest choices were made. By contrast, human
versus computer counterpart was associated with more negative-going amplitudes in channel C1 and more
positive-going amplitudes in channel C6 when dishonest choices were made. The SPM Tmap (for fMRI data)
and the scalp topography (for ERP data) represented the contrast of [Hm(Dis-Hon)-PC(Dis-Hon)]. The
waveforms in the representative channel are shown for the ERP findings. The horizontal black bars represent
the time windows detecting statistical significance. Here, 0 ms indicates the time point of response. Error bar
denotes standard error of the mean. L = left.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0153660.g004
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counterpart’s benefits are considered or not. Our findings have advanced our understanding of
the neural processing of dishonest decisions in several aspects.
First, this study has contributed to the identification of the neural substrates in specific cases
of dishonesty. The characteristic of the specific dishonest decision was that the decision would
affect the interests of both the dishonest individual and the victim. In this study, we directly
compared participants’ behavioral and neural responses to human counterparts with those to
computer counterparts. The participant was informed beforehand that her choice would affect
her counterpart’s income when playing against a human counterpart. However, her decision
would only affect her own interest when playing against a computer counterpart. Our fMRI
data showed that dishonest choices elicited stronger activations in bilateral insula than honest
choices. Further, in a cluster of voxels in the left insula, stronger activations (a trend of signifi-
cance) were elicited by human than computer counterpart when making an honest choice,
while stronger activations were elicited by computer than human counterpart when making a
dishonest choice. This finding was consistent with our first a priori hypothesis that dishonest-
and honest-related insula activations are modulated by the counterpart type.
Given that the insula activations may be associated with either positive or negative feelings
[12], there were two speculated relationships between insula activations and choices in the
Table 3. The ERP findings.
Time (ms)
t1 tp t2 Scalp Area Channel Cluster Z
Time-locked to stimulus onset
Main effect of Choice
NS
Main effect of Investor
Hm > PC
130 160 190 Frontal- Central FC1 1813 5.684
Hm < PC
100 160 190 R Temporal-Parietal TP10 1039 4.868
Interaction between Choice and Investor
NS
Time-locked to response
Main effect of Choice
Dis > Hon
110 250 290 R Frontal F2 1468 3.394
Dis < Hon
-270 -210 -30 L Frontal-Central FC5 1642 3.481
Main effect of Investor
NS
Interaction between Choice and Investor
Hm(Dis-Hon) > PC(Dis-Hon)
-80 60 100 R Central C6 1073 3.567
Hm(Dis-Hon) < PC(Dis-Hon)
-70 -60 250 Central C1 1543 3.403
Note: All results were height thresholded at p < 0.01 and survived cluster-level FWE correction (p < 0.05). t1, t2 and tp represent the beginning, ending
and peaking time (ms) of the cluster, respectively; Channel = EEG channel nearest to the peak signiﬁcance; Cluster = number of voxels within the cluster;
Z = Z value; L = left; R = right; Dis = dishonest choice; Hon = honest choice; Hm = human investor; PC = computer investor.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0153660.t003
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Fig 5. Source reconstruction analyses results.Human and computer investors elicited different source
intensities in brain regions close to medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) and bilateral fusiform face areas (FFA)
within 100~190 ms post stimulus onset. Honest and dishonest choices elicited different source intensities in
brain regions close to striatum (Str) within -270~-30 ms and in areas close to thalamus (Tha) within 110~290
ms post response. The interaction between Choice and Investor was found in brain regions close to left insula
(Ins) within -80~250 ms post response. Results are height-thresholded at p < 0.05 with cluster size > 20
voxels. L = left.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0153660.g005
Table 4. Source reconstruction analyses findings.
Brain Area Cluster Z x y z
Main effect of Investor (100~190 ms stimulus-locked)
L mOFC 1301 2.942 -10 32 -12
R mOFC 553 2.533 14 30 -26
R Lin (BA18) 631 2.510 30 -88 -8
L FFA (BA37) 364 2.335 -32 -80 -2
R FFA (BA37) 124 2.259 48 -54 -2
Main effect of Choice (-270~-30 ms response-locked)
Str 334 2.271 2 -20 -6
Main effect of Choice (110~290 ms response-locked)
L Tha 30 1.769 -8 -36 2
R Tha 49 1.717 6 -30 4
Interaction between Choice and Investor (-80~250 ms response-locked)
L Ins (BA13) 26 1.933 -34 4 -26
Note: All results were height thresholded at p < 0.05 with cluster size > 20 voxels. The ﬁndings were shown
here without considering the direction of the contrasts. The anatomical labels of the brain regions were
based on the nearest fMRI spatial priors employed in the source reconstruction analyses. Cluster = number
of voxels within the cluster; Z = Z value; BA = Brodmann’s area; L = left; R = right; FFA = fusiform face
area; Ins = insula; Lin = lingual gyrus; mOFC = medial orbitofrontal cortex; Tha = thalamus; Str = striatum.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0153660.t004
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present study. The first was that negative feelings activate insula and drive the decision of
rejecting a choice [24, 25]: (1.1) the more negative feelings (i.e. stronger insula activations)
elicited by the anticipation of larger loss of a dishonest choice prevent the selection of a dishon-
est choice and thus precede an honest choice; (1.2) when playing against a human (versus
computer) counterpart, the more negative feelings (i.e. stronger insula activations) about a dis-
honest choice elicited by the anticipation of social norm violation [19–21] and negative conse-
quences to the counterpart [23] prevent the selection of a dishonest choice and thus precede an
honest choice; (1.3) when playing against a computer (versus human) counterpart, the more
negative feelings (i.e. stronger insula activations) about contributing little to counterpart’s ben-
efits prevent the selection of an honest choice and thus precede a dishonest one. By contrast,
the second speculation was that positive feelings activate insula and drive the decision of mak-
ing a choice: (2.1) making a dishonest (versus honest) choice was associated with more positive
feelings (i.e. stronger insula activations) about the anticipation of larger reward; (2.2) when
playing dishonestly, a computer (versus human) counterpart was related with more positive
feelings (and stronger insula activations) caused by fewer anticipations of social norm violation
and counterpart’s negative consequence; (2.3) when playing honestly, a human (versus com-
puter) counterpart is associated with positive feelings (i.e. stronger insula activations) of
increasing another’s benefits. Our fMRI data showed that dishonest (versus honest) choices
elicited stronger activations in bilateral anterior insula whatever the counterpart was human or
computer. Further, in a cluster in the left middle insula, human (versus computer) counterparts
were associated with stronger activations when playing honestly but weaker activations when
playing dishonestly. These results were consistent with (1.2) and (1.3) but not (1.1), while they
were consistent with all of (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3). The findings seem to suggest that the positive
feelings play an important role in making dishonest/honest choices. However, we can’t exclude
the roles of negative feelings in making choices.
The interaction effect between the making of the Choice and identity of the Counterpart
was only detected in the middle part of the left insula. The anterior insula has been documented
to be associated with all types of subjective feelings. The middle insula supposedly integrates
interoceptive signals with other neural inputs to form a combined representation of homeosta-
tically salient features with regards to the individual’s internal and external environments [39,
40]. It is possible that the participants in our study had processed the emotional aspects of dis-
honest choices before the information was translated into subjective feeling. On the other
hand, the activations in the middle insula were consistent with the findings of a recent meta-
analysis by Duerden et al. [25], which showed that brain activations in response to the percep-
tion and experience of emotions within the middle insula were left-lateralized. This further
supports the validity of our results. More importantly, the left middle insula may be used to dif-
ferentiate dishonest decisions with bad intentions from making general risky decisions, which
are associated with anterior insula activations and are crucial for survival [41].
Stronger fMRI activations were detected for dishonest choices compared to those of honest
choices in the bilateral striatum, regardless of whether the investors were humans or comput-
ers. The striatum activations were supposed to reflect the expected reward of a choice [42].
Therefore, a dishonest choice made during our study might bring forth larger expected reward
than an honest choice. More importantly, activations in these areas were not significantly dif-
ferent between human and computer counterparts. This suggests that these areas do not reflect
the neural processing during the consideration of counterpart’s benefits.
Secondly, this study also contributed to our understanding of the quick and dynamic neural
responses during the making of a dishonest choice. Consistent with our second a priori
hypothesis, the results clearly showed that dishonest choices were found to elicit more nega-
tive-going ERP amplitudes compared to honest choices in the left frontal-central sites within
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the interval -270~-30 ms (0 ms denotes the time of response). In accordance to our knowledge,
this study is the first to report the neurophysiological findings related to dishonest decisions.
The interaction between Choice and Investor was found to fall within -80~250 ms in the
medial and right central sites. This depicts that when making honest choices, human versus
computer counterpart was associated with less negative-going amplitudes in channel C1 and
less positive-going amplitudes (nonsignificant trend) in channel C6. By contrast, when making
dishonest choices, human versus computer counterpart was associated with more negative-
going amplitudes in channel C1 and more positive-going amplitudes in channel C6. Time of
commencement, at the peak, and at the end of this interaction effect all occurred after the time
for the main effect of Choice reported above. Furthermore, the pattern of scalp distributions
was also different. These results also supported the idea that the neural processing preceding
dishonest decisions is different when the decision maker considers the interests of the counter-
part, as compared to cases in which she does not. It is expected that after making a decision
having considered the material reward and risk, lagged and distinct neural processing would be
engaged to specifically deal with the conditions associated with the benefits of the counterpart.
Considering that the time window of this interaction effect would have extended to even after
the time of response, it is possible that some parts of the neural processing specific to the condi-
tions associated with the counterpart’s benefits were involved, even if it contributed little to the
current decision. For example, a memory was encoded for the negative feelings related to the
decision to interact dishonestly with a human investor. Such neural processing may have influ-
enced the following choices. These hypotheses need to be tested in future studies.
We have found more positive-going amplitudes when dishonest choices are made, com-
pared to that found for honest choices in the right frontal sites within an interval post the
response, i.e., 110~290 ms. A negative-going electric amplitudes deflection called error-related
negativity (ERN) was detected most prominently at frontal sites within 200 ms post erroneous
button press [43, 44]. A previous study by Yu and Zhou [45] found larger ERN for risky (“to
bet”) than for safe (“not to bet”) choices, suggesting that the ERN plays a role in alerting the
brain to the potential negative consequences of a risky action. Compared with their results, our
finding showed a reversed pattern at frontal sites when the honest and dishonest choices were
regarded as “not to bet” and “to bet,” respectively. This remains an open question, which is
why our post-response ERP findings are different from those by Yu and Zhou [45].
Thirdly, this study has contributed to the delineation of a neural model to describe the
dynamic interactions between temporal and spatial neural processing in the dishonest deci-
sions. The fMRI and ERP data were acquired via conducting the test on the same group of vol-
unteers employing the same task paradigms. Furthermore, our behavioral data showed that the
frequency of dishonest choices (and hence also the frequency of honest choices) was similar
between sessions, suggesting that participants in both data collection sessions might have used
similar cognitive/affective strategies. Therefore, the neural responses recorded by both fMRI
and ERP methodologies supposedly originate from the similar neural sources. Consistent with
our third a priori hypothesis, the source analyses showed that the difference in ERP amplitudes
between the dishonest and honest choices within −270~−30 ms originated from the striatum.
Later, within -80~250 ms, the interaction between Choice and Investor was found to originate
from the left insula. These findings suggested that, within a short interval before response, the
reward-related processing is triggered when generally making a dishonest decision. Soon after
its initiation, the emotion-processing is elicited specific to the condition associated with the
counterpart’s interests.
The difference in ERP amplitudes between when dishonest and honest choices are made
within 110~290 ms was found to originate from the thalamus. Plenty of previous studies have
highlighted the roles of thalamus in arousal regulation [46]. In line with this idea, participants
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in our study might spend more effort to regulate arousal when making dishonest choices when
compared to the case of honest choices. This explanation also aids the understanding of the dif-
ferences in ERP findings between our study and that of Yu and Zhou [45]. The difference is
that larger ERN in their study was supposed to reflect increased error warnings for risky
choices. However, the larger frontal positivity found in our study might reflect increased regu-
lation of arousal for dishonest choices. However, future studies should further test this idea.
The ERP results associated with the effects of Choice were all time-locked to response. By
contrast, the main effect of Investor were only associated with the stimulus-locked ERPs. That
is, human versus computer investor elicited more positive-going amplitudes in the frontal-cen-
tral sites and more negative-going amplitudes in the right occipito-temporal sites within
100~190 ms time-locked to stimulus. This result was consistent with the ERP components
named N170 and its counterpart VPP reported in previous studies on face perception [47], and
was speculated to reflect the early discrimination between human and computer counterpart.
The fMRI data accompanied with the source reconstruction analyses results suggested that the
ERPs were originated from the bilateral medial orbitofrontal cortex and fusiform face area, also
consistent with the findings of previous neuroimaging studies on face perception [48]. Given
that the mean interval between stimulus and response was longer than 1000 ms, whereas the
main effect of Investor was detected within 200 ms post stimulus and the effects involving
Choice was found within 300 ms prior to response, it seems that the visual information about
counterpart type is processed prior to the selection of a choice. However, we cannot exclude
the possibility that the Choice-associated neural processing happens earlier. The onset of the
neural correlates of Choice may be not time-locked to stimulus presentation and is thus diffi-
cult to be detected through the ERP method. Future studies should further uncover the tempo-
ral information of neural processing before making a dishonest choice.
Several limitations are present in this research project. The first is that only female volun-
teers were recruited. The lack of males hinders the general applicability of the results. Secondly,
we failed to find significant sources of intensities in some brain regions as indicated by the
fMRI results for the same contrast. A possible explanation is that the ERP source analyses
might have ignored some activities in the brain, because the ERP (but not the fMRI) method
focuses on time- and phase-locked signals. Thirdly, a laboratory experimental task paradigm
was recruited in this study to control the variables. However, test subjects participating in the
experiment conducted in this environment may have behaved differently compared to dishon-
est persons in real life. Fourthly, in this study, the dishonest choice was always entangled with
being a risky choice and the honest choice was always entangled with being a sure bet. Future
studies on dishonest decisions should further dissociate the neural correlates of the self-serving
intention from those of the risk of the action itself, respectively. Fifthly, a computer counterpart
was employed in this study to eliminate the possibility that a participant made a decision after
considering either the material or immaterial interests of the counterpart. To dissociate the
effect of investor type from the effect of the presence of a payment, a future study should fur-
ther investigate the task condition in which the counterpart is a human whose income is not
influenced by the participant’s choice. Finally, the fMRI and ERP data from the same partici-
pant were not recorded simultaneously. The time lag might have caused variability in brain
activations even though the participants were the same. Future studies on the neural processing
preceding dishonest decisions should document neural responses simultaneously. They should
also recruit samples from different sample groups, as well as task paradigms sensitive to investi-
gating the other cognitive/affective functions involved in dishonesty.
In summary, the findings support the hypothesis that specific neural processing is involved
when making a dishonest decision, when the interests of the counterpart are considered. Fur-
ther, our results provide a model describing the dynamic interactions between temporal and
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spatial neural processing when making a dishonest decision. That is, dishonest and honest
choices elicit different neural responses in the striatum during −270~−30 ms, which may be
associated with the anticipation of a reward. Later, playing honestly (versus dishonestly)
against human and computer investors elicit different responses in the left insula within
−80~250 ms, which may reflect the consideration of the counterpart’s benefits. Finally, dishon-
est and honest choices elicit different neural responses in thalamus during 110~290 ms, which
may represent the regulation of arousal.
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